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Abstract—To gain confidence in safety-critical interactive sys-
tems, formal modelling and analysis plays a vital role. The aim
of this paper is to use Coloured Petri Nets to model and analyze
safety-critical interactive systems. We present a technique to
construct a single Coloured Petri Net model of the user interface,
interaction and functionality of safety-critical interactive systems
and then analyze the achieved Coloured Petri Net model using a
state space analysis method. There are several reasons for using
Coloured Petri Nets. Coloured Petri Nets provides a graphical
representation and hierarchical structuring mechanism, and a
state space verification technique, which allows querying the state
space to investigate behaviours of a system. There are several
tools that supports Coloured Petri Nets including the CPN Tool
which helps in building CPN models and allows simulation and
analysis using state spaces. The technique to model and analyze
safety-critical interactive systems is illustrated using a simplified
infusion pump example.
Index Terms—Coloured Petri Nets, Formal Modelling and
analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Interactive systems are systems which have a significant
amount of interaction between computers and humans. The
two main components of interactive systems are the interactive
and the functional. A good user-interface plays a significant
role for both the components. A user interface must be simple
and easy to understand so that users can complete their
intended task efficiently and with minimal difficulty. User
interface is made up of widgets which could be buttons,
sensors, touch-screen or speech. Each widget has a certain
set of behaviours associated with it which control and change
the interactive and functional behaviour of the system. The
functional aspect of the system deals with the operations,
calculations and information it takes and returns to the user
interface. There are various interactive systems which, if they
fail, can cause significant damage to property, the environment
or even human life. Such interactive systems are referred to
as safety-critical interactive systems.
Due to advances in science and technology, there has been
an increase in complexity in the safety-critical interactive
systems, and this complexity can be a source of errors.
There are various reasons for the failure of safety-critical
interactive systems, like faulty design and software errors [1].
There could be mistakes in the specification of the system,
mistakes in the software or hardware design or errors could
occur when humans interact with a system. Researchers have
been working for many years to solve problems or issues in
safety-critical interactive systems due to poor user interfaces
and functionality, for example, in avionics [2] or in medical
infusion pumps [3] [4] to ensure that safety-critical interactive
systems are safe before entering the market and function
correctly in all situations. Therefore, it is necessary to model
and analyze safety-critical interactive systems using formal
methods in terms of user interface, interaction and functional
specifications to ensure that the system meets all requirements.
The focus of this paper is to develop a technique to model
and analyze safety-critical interactive systems using formal
methods that covers all the various aspects (user interface,
interaction and functional) to make sure that the system will
act as expected before implemented. For modelling we take
advantage of existing formalisms: Z, Presentation Interaction
Models (PIMs) and Presentation Models (PMs) (as for instance
in [5] [6]). From this existing basis we create a Coloured Petri
Net model of safety-critical interactive systems and analyze the
model using a state space method.
II. RELATED WORK
There are two strands of our research: formal methods and
human computer interaction (HCI). We will look at how both
of these strands are used together, with a specific focus on
modelling and analyzing safety-critical interactive systems.
Formal methods have been used for HCI for many years
now. This is evident by looking at Jacky’s work in [7] where
Z [8] has been used for modelling the interface of a radiation
machine. Paterno et al. in [9] used LOTOS for modelling
and evaluating the usability of user interfaces. Doherty and
Harrison in [10] used VDM for describing interactors and
formal reasoning about the functionality of a user interface.
ICO [11] is one more example of a formalism that was
developed based on the existing formalism of Petri Nets.
Barboni et al. in [12] used ICO on a cockpit display system
for describing the interactive widgets, user applications and
user interface servers. Thimbleby in [13] has presented work
to detect errors in safety-critical interactive systems related to
number entry. Silva et al. [14] reverse engineer an abstract
model of a graphical user interface and ensure it satisfies
the set of requirements. They have also described the IVY
project which is used for analysis of interactive system design.
Campos and Harrison in [15] have used the IVY tool with
Modal Action Logic (MAL) for modelling and analysis of
interactive systems. Researchers have also worked on creating
models that can be used in the design process of interactive
systems in a more general manner to ensure the requirements
are met, for example, [16].
These general modelling approaches have to tackle the
problem of separation of concerns between interface and
functional elements, while at the same time managing the
relationship between the two [17] [18]. One of the focuses of
this paper is to address this issue and bridge the gap between
the user interface and underlying system functionality.
III. FORMAL METHODS AND TOOLS
Formal Methods are mathematically-based techniques, lan-
guages and notations that are used for designing, modelling
and analyzing hardware and software systems. The main
advantage of formally modelling a system is that we assure
that our design really does what is intended and we are able to
identify potential problems before we can implement a system.
In our work we have used existing formalisms: presentation
models, presentation interaction models and Z (PM/PIM/Z) as
our basis [6]. These three formalisms result in three separate
models (user interface, interaction and functional) and a lot of
work is required to do the coupling of these separate models
[18]. To overcome this issue, we use Coloured Petri Nets
(CPN) and create a single model which have all the three
aspects (user interface, interaction and functional)
Coloured Petri Nets [19] is a language used for the mod-
elling and analysis of systems. There are a lot of tools that
can be used for CPN [20] [21]. CPN Tool v.4.0.1 from [22] is
used in this work. Using CPN Tool, it is possible to investigate
the behaviour of the modelled system using simulation, to
verify properties by means of state space methods and model
checking by writing functions in SML. These are the main
reason of choosing CPNs. We illustrate our technique with a
simplified infusion pump example.
IV. EXAMPLE: SIMPLIFIED INFUSION PUMP
As the focus of this paper is on safety-critical interactive
systems, we consider the simplified infusion pump as shown
in Figure 1 to help explain the process. It comprises of
one Display and six buttons; Display, NoButton, YesButton,
InfoButton, MinusButton, PlusButton and OnOffButton button.
This makes total of seven widgets.
There is a total of six states, one of which the pump can be
in at any given point in time, which are: init, info, setvolume,
settime, confirmrate and infusing. Init is the initial state of
a system. Then the user can press press InfoButton and can
see the battery information. A user can then set the time and
volume using the PlusButton and MinusButton and lastly press
YesButton to start infusing.
Fig. 1. Prototype of Simple Infusion Pump
There is a set of operations/functions associated with the
simple infusion pump like IncreaseVolume, DecreaseVolume,
SetVolume, IncreaseTime, DecreaseTime, SetTime, SetRate and
StartInfusing. In each state there are seven observations that
can be made: battery whose value can be sufficient or insufi-
cient, infusing whose value can be yes or no, timer, volume,
volumeleft, infusionrate and timeleft are the observations that
have natural number as their value. In the init state, we
assume that the battery is sufficient, pump is not infusing
and all the other observations are set to zero. The operations
IncreaseVolume and DecreaseVolume allow the user to change
the value of a dose to be infused using the PlusButton
and MinusButton. These operations changes the value of the
observation volume by adding one or subtracting one from its
current value. The operation SetVolume will set the value of
the observation volumeleft to the current value of the observa-
tion volume. The operations IncreaseTime and DecreaseTime
allow the user to change the duration of infusion using the
PlusButton and MinusButton. These operations changes the
value of the observation timer by adding one or subtracting
one from its current value. The operation SetTime will set
the value of the observation timeleft to the current value of
the observation timer. The SetRate operation will set the the
value of the observation infusionrate by dividing the current
value of volume by the current value of timer and the operation
StartInfusing will set the value of the observation infusing to
yes.
V. MODELLING SAFETY-CRITICAL INTERACTIVE
SYSTEMS USING COLOURED PETRI NETS
We start with describing a process [23] to model user
interface using Coloured Petri Nets with the help of simple
infusion pump example as shown in Figure 1. For modelling
a user interface of an interactive system, three things that needs
consideration are: firstly, all the widgets that a system have,
secondly, the category of these widgets, i.e., deciding if the
widget is just a responder which displays messages or the
widget is actually doing some action etc., and thirdly what
type of behaviours are associated with these widgets, i.e.,
functions that are executed when the widget is interacted with.
These could be underlying non-interactive system functions
which we call S-behaviours and interactive functions which
we call I-behaviours. Each widget is represented as a triple
"(WidgetName,Category,(Behaviour(s)))" and each state of a
system is described separately as a set of triples. For example,
there are seven widgets and six states for simple infusion
pump, then each state is represented as a set of seven triples.
The user interface of a simple infusion pump is given in
Table I. WidgetName is an enumeration type that represents
the names of the seven widgets (Display, NoButton, YesButton,
InfoButton, MinusButton, PlusButton and OnOffButton) of a
simple infusion pump shown in Figure 1. Each of these
widgets are categorized using the widget categorization hi-
erarchy given in [24]. In this case the widget Display is
of category Responder and all the six buttons falls under
ActionControl category. These two categories are represented
by an enumerated colour set Category with two identifiers:
Responder and ActCtrl (short form for ActionControl). There
is a total of 17 behaviours associated with these widgets,
represented by an enumerated colour set Behaviour. As one
widget can have more than one behaviour, we need a list colour
set Behaviours. Each widget is represented as a triple which
is given by a product colour set widgetdescr as shown in table
I. The colour set pmodel is a list of widgetdescr which allows
us to create a set of triples for each state.
As there are six states (init, info, setvolume, settime, con-
firmrate and infusing), there would be six value declarations
with the same name. We have given three declarations as
examples. A value declaration binds a value to an identifier
(which then works as a constant) [25]. In table I, init, info,
setvolume and infusing are the constants that represent states
of the pump. Each constant consists of a set of seven widget
triples. For example, the init constant comprises of a set of
seven widget triples. The first set of triples means that in the
init state, the widget Display is of category Responder and
has the S displaystartmessage behaviour associated with it.
This means that a start message is displayed on the display in
the init state. The second set of triples means that in the init
state, the widget NoButton is of category ActCtrl and has no
behaviour associated with it. This means that interacting with
NoButton will do nothing in the init state. The fourth set of
triples means that in the init state, the widget InfoButton is of
category ActCtrl and has I info behaviour associated with it.
This means that interacting with InfoButton will change the
state of a pump from init to info. In a similar manner all the
states are represented by constants with a set of seven triples as
shown in table I. This is how a user interface is modelled using
Coloured Petri Nets. The table I gives a model of a complete
user interface which makes it is easy to understand what the
states of the system are and what widgets are available to the
user in every state and what the behaviour of those widgets
are.
Although I-behaviours in each state mean that interacting
with that particular widget will result in navigation from one
state to another, to understand the navigational possibilities,
it is always better to have some graphical representation that
provides information about the dynamic behaviour of a user-
interface i.e., interactivity. Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the part of
the CPN model of a simple infusion pump. In this paper we
use the Hierarchical Coloured Petri Nets [25].
The three main components of Coloured Petri Nets are
places, transitions and arcs. In our work, places represent
states of a system, transitions give meaning to the behaviours
of the user interface and arcs connect places to transitions
and transitions to places which shows the navigation. The
expressions on the arcs to and from I-behaviour transitions are
the constants as described in Table I and the arc expressions
to and from S-behaviour transitions are used for modelling the
functionality of a system. Each state of a pump is represented
as a separate page which is interconnected by fusion places.
Each page will show the navigational possibility from that state
and also the functionality associated with that state. The place
named Z is also added to every page which is the record of
observations showing the values of each observation in each
state.
Table II shows the colour sets (types) and variables which
are required to form the arc expressions to model function-
ality of a system. Colour set INFUSING is declared as the
enumerated colour set that can have exactly two values Yes or
No. Colour set BATTERY is also declared as an enumerated
colour set that can have two values sufficient or insufficient.
Colour set NAT is declared as the integer colour set. Colour
set Z is a record colour set with a record of all the seven
observations. As the operations/functions would be written as
arc expressions so we need to declare variables which could be
bound to different values of their respective colour sets during
simulation. There are seven variables battery, timer, volume,
volumeleft, timeleft, infusionrate and infusing as shown in
Table II.
Figure 2 shows the structure of the Init page of the pump
which models the init state. There are two places init and info
which belong to init and info fusion sets respectively. This
page shows the navigational possibility from the init state. It
clearly shows that from init we can move to the info state
by firing the transition I info. If we look at the init constant
in Table I, there is only one I-behaviour, so the model will
contain just one transition. A marking on the place init shows
the value of the constant init which gives information about
the available widgets and their associated behaviours in the
init state. As each place has the colour set pmodel attached
to it, so the arc expression must also be of the same type.
The constant init forms the arc expression for the arc which is
going outwards from the init place and info will form the arc
expression for the incoming arc expression of place info. We
have one fusion place named Z added to the model which is
of type colour set Z. A marking on the place Z is the record
of the observations described in section IV showing the initial
values.
Figure 3 shows the structure of page setvolume which
represents the setvolume state of a pump. This state allow
user to set the volume to be infused. The model comprises
of four places: setvolume, info, settime and Z and four tran-
sitions : I info, S DecreaseVolume, S IncreaseVolume and
I settime S setvolume. We have named the transitions with
TABLE I
USER INTERFACE OF SIMPLE INFUSION PUMP USING COLOURED PETRI
NETS
colset WidgetName = with Display | NoButton | YesButton |
InfoButton | MinusButton | PlusButton |
OnOffButton;
colset Category = with ActCtrl | Responder;
colset Behaviour = with S displaystartmessage | S displaybatterylife |
S displayinfusingmessage | S decreasevolume |
S increasevolume | S Setvolume |
S setrate | S decreasetime |
S increasetime | S infusing | S settime |
I confirmrate | I settime | I init |
I info | I infuse | I setvolume;
colset Behaviours = list Behaviour;
colset widgetdescr = product WidgetName * Category * Behaviours;
colset pmodel = list widgetdescr;
val init = [(Display, Responder, [S displaystartmessage]),
(NoButton, ActCtrl, [ ]),
(YesButton, ActCtrl, [ ]),
(InfoButton, ActCtrl, [I info]),
(MinusButton, ActCtrl, [ ]),
(PlusButton, ActCtrl, [ ]),
(OnOffButton, ActCtrl, [ ])];
val info = [(Display, Responder, [S displaybatterylife]),
(NoButton, ActCtrl, [I init]),
(YesButton, ActCtrl, [I setvolume]),
(InfoButton, ActCtrl, [ ]),
(MinusButton, ActCtrl, [ ]),
(PlusButton, ActCtrl, [ ]),
(OnOffButton, ActCtrl, [ ])];
val setvolume = [(Display, Responder, [S decreasevolume,
S increasevolume]),
(NoButton, ActCtrl, [I info]),
(YesButton, ActCtrl, [I settime, S setvolume]),
(InfoButton, ActCtrl, [ ]),
(MinusButton, ActCtrl, [S decreasevolume]),
(PlusButton, ActCtrl, [S increasevolume]),
(OnOffButton, ActCtrl, [ ])];
val infusing = [(Display, Responder, [S displayinfusingmessage]),
(NoButton, ActCtrl, [ ]),
(YesButton, ActCtrl, [ ]),
(InfoButton, ActCtrl, [ ]),
(MinusButton, ActCtrl, [ ]),
(PlusButton, ActCtrl, [ ]),
(OnOffButton, ActCtrl, [ ])];
TABLE II
COLOUR SETS AND VARIABLES FOR FUNCTIONALITY
colset INFUSING = with Yes | No;
colset BATTERY = with sufficient | insufficient;
colset NAT = int;
colset Z = record battery:BATTERY *
timer:NAT *
volume:NAT *
volumeleft:NAT *
infusionrate:NAT *
timeleft:NAT *
infusing:INFUSING;
var battery : BATTERY;
var timer : NAT;
var volume : NAT;
var volumeleft : NAT;
var infusionrate : NAT;
var timeleft : NAT;
var infusing : INFUSING;
Fig. 2. Init page
I settime S setvolume as these two behaviours occur simul-
taneously. The model shows the navigational possibility from
the setvolume state. A user can go to the settime state by
firing the transition I settime S setvolume or can go to the
state info by firing the I info transition. If a user is in
setvolume state, then the marking on the place setvolume
will have a token that will give information about the avail-
able widgets and its associated behaviour. Occurrences of
transitions will update the corresponding markings on the
places. There are three functions associated with the setvolume
state: IncreaseVolume,DecreaseVolume and SetVolume. The
arc expressions on the arcs going to and from the S-behaviour
transitions represents the functionality.
An output arc from fusion place Z to the S IncreaseVolume
transition has an expression that simply contains assignments
which set each variable to its current value. This set of
assignments "picks up" the current values of the variables
ready to be used by the second arc, i.e. an input arc to the place
Z from the same S IncreaseVolume transition. This second
arc, the one to the place Z from the same S IncreaseVolume
transition assigns each variable to its new value. Every time
the transition S IncreaseVolume fires, the value of the variable
volume is increased by one.
We can also add guards to the transitions. If we want that
the transition S IncreaseVolume should not be enabled if the
value of the observation volume is greater than or equal to
three, then we can add the guard [volume < 3] to the transition
S IncreaseVolume as shown in Fig. 3. Similarly we model
the other two operations DecreaseVolume and SetVolume by
adding the relevant arc expressions and guards as shown in
Fig. 3.
Because of the space restrictions we are not showing the
Fig. 3. SetVolume page
info, settime and confirmrate pages. The last state is the
infusing state and the CPN model of this state is shown in
Fig. 4. There is no other state where the pump can go after
entering the infusing state. This is how we can make use of
the Coloured Petri Nets to create a single model of safety-
critical interactive systems which have all the three aspects
(user interface, interaction and functionality). Now we want
to investigate if the CPN model is behaving as intended. In
the next section we will investigate the behaviour of the CPN
model of the pump.
VI. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
For safety-critical interactive systems, it is important to
ensure that a system is behaving as expected. In this work we
use a state space method to analyze the behaviour of a system.
The state space graph is a set of nodes that are connected by
arcs. A strongly connected component (SCC) of the state space
is a maximal sub-graph, whose nodes are mutually reachable
from each other [25].
State space methods have several advantages [26]: they can
be automatically constructed, which provides computer-aided
analysis and verification of the behaviour of the modelled
system; the tool is fully integrated into the CPN Tool; it
includes a lot of information about the behaviour of the system,
which can answer a large set of analysis questions; it can also
be used for debugging and testing the system.
Fig. 4. Infuse page
A state space report can also be generated using the CPN
tool [22]. The state space report includes statistical information
about the size of the state space and SCC graph. In addition,
the report provides information about home markings, dead
markings, dead transitions and live transitions [25]. The state
space report of the CPN model of simple infusion pump is
summarized in table III. The complete state space comprises
of 332 nodes and 680 arcs, while the SCC graph comprises
of 7 nodes and 10 arcs. The size of the SCC graph is smaller
than the state space graph indicating that there are cycles. Each
SCC node has particular number of nodes and arcs from state
space graph, which are grouped in that SCC node.
TABLE III
STATISTICS OF THE CPN MODEL OF SIMPLE INFUSION PUMP
State Space Graph
Number of Nodes 332
Number of Arcs 680
SCC Graph
Number of Nodes 7
Number of Arcs 10
Home Markings None
Number of Dead Markings 4 (Nodes [39,51,69,85])
Dead Transition Instances None
Live Transition Instances None
A. Investigation of General Properties
1) Deadlock freedom: It is important to check if there is
any deadlock in the model. Deadlock means that a user enters
into a state in which no action can be taken. In CPN, a system
is said to be deadlock-free if no dead marking can be reached
from the initial marking. This means that from an initial state,
the user will never get into a state in which no actions can be
taken. A dead marking is a marking with no enabled transition.
In Table III, we see our model has dead markings.
If we want to check for the improper terminations (i.e.
deadlocks), we first have to find the valid terminal markings
and then see in the list of dead markings if there exists
a marking or markings which does not exist in the list of
valid terminal markings. If there exists such marking then it
means that the system has improper termination i.e. deadlock,
otherwise it is free from deadlocks.
A function given in table IV detects the improper termina-
tion for our model.
TABLE IV
SHOWING INVALID TERMINAL NODES FOR SIMPLE INFUSION PUMP MODEL
fun ValidTerminalMarking n = (Mark.infuse’infuse 1 n
= 1‘[(Display, ActCtrl, [S displayinfusingmessage]),
(NoButton, ActCtrl, []),
(YesButton, ActCtrl, []),
(InfoButton, ActCtrl, []),
(MinusButton, ActCtrl, []),
(PlusButton, ActCtrl, []),
(OnOffButton, ActCtrl, [])] )
fun InValidTerminal()=PredNodes(ListDeadMarkings(),
fn n => not (ValidTerminalMarking n),
NoLimit);
output:
val it =[]: Node list
The function ValidTerminalMarking states that marking on
place infuse on the first instance of page infuse is the expected
terminal marking. The function InValidTerminal searches
through all the dead markings. If the dead marking matches the
markings stated in the function ValidTerminalMarking, then it
gives an empty list otherwise it lists the dead markings which
are other than the expected terminal markings. In this case
we have an empty list as an output i.e. there are no invalid
terminal markings. Hence there are no deadlocks.
2) Livelock: Livelock i.e. a cycle in which no progress is
being made, occurs when sequences are executed indefinitely
without possibility of making effective progress. A livelock
is detected when the state space contains a cycle that leads
to no markings outside the cycle. In this case, once the
cycle is entered it will repeat forever. A CPN model which
terminates properly should be free from livelocks. Therefore,
it is important to check that the CPN model of a safety critical
interactive device doesn’t contain livelocks, unless intended.
There might be a case that the model should have a livelock
state, but this is very uncommon. So finding a livelock state
is undoubtedly useful and should be a part of any analysis.
It is quite easy to detect livelocks in a small and simple
model by simply looking at it. But for real devices, this is
not possible. So, there should be some uniform approach that
finds out such livelock states.
A convenient way to check the absence of livelocks is to
study the automatically generated graph of strongly connected
components (SCC graph). Depending on the structure of the
generated state space graph, model checking the absence of
livelocks takes one of the following two forms [27] :
• If the state space graph and its SCC graph are isomorphic
and also there are no self-loops, then the model is free
of livelocks;
• If the state space contains self-loops or if there is at least
one strongly connected component that consists of more
than one node, then we need to examine to see if all
terminal components are trivial that is, they consist of a
single node and no arcs. A non-trivial terminal component
represents a livelock in the model.
The query shown in table V verifies the absence of self-loop
terminal nodes.
TABLE V
QUERY TO VERIFY THE ABSENCE OF SELF LOOP TERMINAL NODES IN
CPN
fun SelfLoopTerminal n = (OutNodes (n) = [n])
fun InValidTerminal()=PredNodes(EntireGraph,
fn n => (SelfLoopTerminal n),
NoLimit);
The code given in table V finds invalid terminals that end
in self loops. The function SelfLoopTerminal uses the in-
built function OutNodes to get a list of output nodes. The
argument PredNodes specifies a function which maps each
node into a Boolean value. The nodes which evaluate to false
are ignored; the others take part in further analysis. The value
EntireGraph denotes the set of all nodes in the state space.
The evaluation function (fn n=> (SelfLoopTerminal n)) maps a
SelfLoopTerminal node n into itself. The val NoLimit specifies
an infinite limit, i.e., that the search continues until the entire
search area has been traversed. If a code returns an empty list,
then there are no self loop terminals which means that the
CPN model is livelock free.
In our model we get an empty list as in Table VI which
means that there are no invalid terminal nodes that end in self
loops. Hence the model is livelock free.
TABLE VI
DETECTING LIVELOCK IN SIMPLE INFUSION PUMP MODEL
Output:
val it =[] : Node list
3) Checking Values: It is also important to check the values
allowed for a safety-critical interactive system. For example,
limits on the volume to be infused or limits on the time of
the infusion. The state space method allows us to check if
there exist values which violate these limits. For the simple
infusion pump, we have a guard volume < 3 on the transition
S IncreaseVolume. This means that in the entire state space
there should not exist an arc where the value of the variable
volume is three or more. We verify this by writing the code
written in Table VII to query the state space to see if there is
any marking where the value of the variable volume is three.
TABLE VII
RETURNS ALL THE ARCS IN THE STATE SPACE GRAPH WHERE THE VALUE
OF THE VARIABLE volume IS 3
fun setvolumearcs(volume:NAT): Arc list =
PredAllArcs (
fn a=> case ArcToBE a of
Bind.setvolume’S IncreaseVolume (1,
{battery= , infusing= , infusionrate= , timeleft= ,
timer= , volume=3, volumeleft= })
=> volume = 3 | = > false)
Output:
val it=[]: Arc list
We get the empty arc list as an output. This means that
there exists no such arc in the entire state space where the
value of a variable volume is three. Similarly we can check
other values.
4) Reachability: Reachability is another important property
that needs to be analyzed for safety-critical interactive systems.
Reachability means that all system behaviours can be obtained
by a user by applying some sequence of commands at some
point in their interaction.
Reachability functions in the CPN tool [21] allow checking
reachability of one node from another. For example, we want
to check whether a user can reach the setvolume state from the
info state. For that, we first need to find out the setvolume and
info nodes from the state space graph. The functions given in
table VIII and IX find the setvolume and info nodes.
We can use the reachablilty function to check if the nodes
given in Table VIII are reachable from nodes given in Table
IX. Table X shows the reachability function that checks if we
can reach node 99 from node 98, which evaluates to true. We
can repeat this process for each of the other pairs.
TABLE VIII
RETURNS ALL SETVOLUME NODES IN THE STATE SPACE GRAPH
fun setvolumenodes ()=SearchAllNodes( fn n=>
let
fun setvolumearcs(nil)=false |
setvolumearcs(a :: al : Arc list) =
if ArcToTI a = TI.info’I setvolume 1 orelse
ArcToTI a = TI.settime’I setvolume 1 then
true
else
setvolumearcs(al);
in
setvolumearcs(InArcs(n))
end, fn n => n, [], op::);
Output:
val it=[99,96,94,93,92,86,83,82,78,77,70,67,66,
62,60,6,52,49,48,46,40,4,37,36,33,318,301,
3,285,284,282,28,278,27,268,26,259,258,255,
251,241,231,230,229,227,226,224,219,215,214,
212,21,202,201,200,20,198,197,194,19,189,186,
185,182,176,171,170,169,168,162,160,15,159,
158,156,150,146,145,144,143,138,137,135,134,
133,130,126,125,121,120,12,116,114,113,112,
106,105,101,10]: Node list
TABLE IX
RETURNS ALL INFO NODES IN THE STATE SPACE GRAPH
fun infonodes ()=SearchAllNodes( fn n=>
let
fun infoarcs(nil)=false |
infoarcs(a :: al : Arc list) =
if ArcToTI a = TI.init’I info 1 orelse
ArcToTI a = TI.setvolume’I info 1
then
true
else
infoarcs(al);
in
infoarcs(InArcs(n))
end, fn n => n, [], op::);
output:
val it=[98,91,9,89,81,76,75,73,65,61,59,56,5,47,
45,44,35,34,330,323,32,317,316,314,311,306,302,
300,329,294,289,283,281,280,277,276,274,271,267,
266,264,257,256,254,252,250,25,247,244,242,240,237,
234,228,225,223,222,218,217,213,211,210,208,204,2,
199,196,195,193,190,188,184,183,181,18,178,175,174,
167,166,161,157,155,154,151,15,149,142,140,136,132,
131,129,124,119,118,111,110,104,100]: Node list
TABLE X
REACHABILITY FUNCTION TO TEST REACHABILITY FROM info TO
setvolume NODE
Reachable(98,99)
output:
val it=true: bool
TABLE XI
REACHABILITY FUNCTION TO FIND THE PATH FROM info TO setvolume
Reachable’(98,99)
output:
A path from node 98 to node 99 is:[98,66,99]
val it=true: bool
TABLE XII
TOTAL REACHABILITY FUNCTION
AllReachable()
output:
val it=false: bool
If we want to know the path to reach the setvolume node
from the info node, the function given in table XI is evaluated
and this tells us the path from the info node to the setvolume
node.
Reachability functions provided by the CPN Tool also
allow checking total reachability which means the ability to
get anywhere from anywhere. The AllReachable function in
the CPN tool determines whether all the reachable markings
are reachable from each other. This is the case iff there is
exactly one strongly connected component [21]. This helps
in verifying that all of the behaviours can be accessed by a
user and also ensures that a user can return back to the state
they came from. Allowing users to return back to the previous
states is important as it allows for correcting errors. For the
simple infusion pump model, the AllReachable evaluates to
false as shown in table XII.
Of course, our CPN model does not have total reachability
as the user cannot return to any other state when in the infusing
state.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have shown how we can create a CPN
model of a safety-critical interactive system that has all the
aspects (user interface, interaction and functionality) in a
single model using the CPN Tool. We have used the state space
analysis method to investigate the behaviour of a system. We
have given examples of investigating the behaviour of a simple
infusion pump and presented the results. We believe that using
this technique can contribute to the safer use of interactive
systems. We can use this technique to model and investigate
new and existing systems to ensure that these systems behave
as intended. We have given an example from the medical
domain to illustrate the approach.
In future we would like to apply this technique to other
safety critical domains such as the control system of nuclear
power plant.
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